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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last 15 to 20 years, paradoxical interventions 
--the most common and controversial of which is symptom 
prescription--have been popular treatment strategies in 
psychotherapy. A brief survey of the professional 
literature reveals that there is much disagreement among 
therapists regarding how these techniques work, when they 
are indicated, and even what constitutes a paradoxical 
intervention. It is not surprising, then, to find similar 
dissent regarding the relative importance of the ethical 
issues involved in the use of paradoxical interventions. 
Some therapists employ paradoxical techniques 
frequently and tend to minimize the ethical questions 
associated with their use (e.g., Fisch, Weakland, & Segal, 
1982; Haley, 1987). Others say that, in consideration 
of the ethical dilemmas that the use of paradoxical 
interventions raise, such methods should only be employed 
as a last resort (e.g., Fischer, Anderson, & Jones, 1981; 
Van Hoose & Kottler, 1985). Still others, such as Whan 
(1983), would contend that the use of paradoxical 
interventions is inherently unethical and their use can 
never be justified. Further, critics such as Henderson 
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(1987) and Schmidt (1986) warn that psychotherapists who 
use paradoxical interventions may be inviting claims of 
malpractice. 
Two of the primary ethical issues regarding the use 
of paradoxical interventions relate to the use of deception 
and the violation of informed consent., The first 
objection--that paradoxical interventions involve 
deception--centers around the idea that dishonesty, or 
a lack of sincerity, is incompatible with the trust that 
is essential to the therapeutic relationship (Whan, 1983). 
For example, consider the use of symptom prescription in 
directing an insomniac to stay awake or instructing an 
impotent man to prevent himself from having an erection. 
Since one important purpose of therapy is to eliminate 
distress, are such methods "insincere," and, thus, 
unacceptable? The use of deception in employing paradoxical 
interventions is a significant ethical problem which has 
been commented upon by numerous writers (e.g., Deschenes 
& Shepperson, 1983; Haley, 1987; Johnson, 1986; Lindley, 
1987; Tennen, Eron, & Rohrbaugh, 1985; Van Hoose & Kottler, 
1985; Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974; Weeks & L'Abate, 
1982). 
The second objection--that the use of paradoxical 
interventions violates the client's right to informed 
consent--has also been addressed by a number of therapists 
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(e.g., Brown & Slee, 1986; Henderson, 1987; Hunsley, 1988; 
Kolko & Milan, 1986; Weeks & L'Abate, 1982). The Ethical 
Principles of Psychologists (American Psychological 
Association, 1990) require that psychologists provide their 
clients with adequate information regarding treatment 
procedures so that clients may make informed decisions 
about their participation in therapy. However, fully 
disclosing the nature of a paradoxical intervention to 
the client may rob the technique of its impact (Hills, 
Gruszkos, & Strong, 1985; Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 
1967). 
It is clear that the use of paradoxical interventions 
raises significant ethical questions, particularly in regard 
to deception and informed consent. However, almost no 
empirical research has been performed that examines 
psychotherapists' attitudes about these controversial 
techniques. The focus of this study was to identify which 
aspects of the context in which a symptom prescription 
is delivered (i.e., the degree of deception and of informed 
consent) affect its acceptability to psychotherapists. 
3 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Paradoxical Intervention Defined 
The use of paradoxical interventions has not been 
limited to practitioners of any single theoretical 
orientation. These techniques have been espoused by 
therapists from a number of orientations, including 
psychodynamic (Greenberg, 1973), existential (Frankl, 1975), 
Gestalt (Beisser, 1970), and behavioral (Dunlap, 1928). 
However, paradoxical interventions seem to be most widely 
used by family systems therapists (e.g., Selvini-Palazzoli, 
Boscolo, Cecchin, & Prata, 1978; Watzlawick et al., 1974). 
Because paradoxical interventions are described by 
therapists of such varying theoretical perspectives, there 
is no consensus as to exactly what constitutes a paradoxical 
intervention--not even among the acknowledged experts in 
the field (Watson, 1985). At the most simplistic level, 
paradoxical interventions seem to conflict with the goals 
of therapy (Hirschmann & Sprenkle, 1989); they clash with 
"common sense." In fact, the Greek word paradoxos means 
"conflicting with expectation" (American Heritage 
Dictionary, 1982). Paradoxical techniques, then, depart 
from conventional conceptions of how therapy should be 
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conducted. 
The four most common types of paradoxical interventions 
have been identified by Dowd and Milne (1986) as reframing, 
restraining, positioning, and symptom prescription. In 
reframing the therapist provides an alternative meaning 
structure to shift the client's perspective about the 
problematic behavior--usually to a more positive one. 
A therapist may discourage or explicitly prohibit a client 
from changing for a period of time when using a paradoxical 
technique called restraining. With positioning a therapist 
might agree with (or exaggerate) a client's statements 
that reflect a negative view of a situation. Symptom 
prescription involves instructing a client to perform the 
problematic behavior or even to exaggerate its occurrence; 
sometimes the symptom may be "scheduled" to occur at a 
specific time. Symptom prescription is the most popular 
of the various paradoxical interventions (Hirschmann & 
Sprenkle, 1989), as well as the most controversial--
presumably because of its directiveness. For these reasons, 
symptom prescription is the paradoxical intervention with 
which this study is most concerned. 
Theories of Paradoxical Intervention 
In light of the wide variety of theoretical frameworks 
within which the use of paradoxical interventions has been 
advocated, it is not surprising that a number of conflicting 
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rationales have been advanced for their use (Driscoll, 
1985; Riebel, 1984). Among the common explanations are: 
utilizing resistance to energize change, interrupting the 
system of which the symptom is a part, changing the client's 
perspective on the problem, and counteracting the 
detrimental effects of excessive effort to solve the 
problem. 
The classic rationale for the use of paradoxical 
interventions is that of the "therapeutic double-bind," 
as described by Watzlawick et al. (1967). A therapeutic 
double-bind is the opposite of the sort of "pathogenic 
double-bind" that has been described as a characteristic 
pattern of communication within the families of 
schizophrenics (Bateson, Jackson, Haley, & Weakland, 1956). 
It is worth noting that the notion of a double-bind assumes 
both an intense relationship between the parties involved 
and that the recipient cannot comment upon the double-bind 
or withdraw from the situation in which it occurs. 
Watzlawick et al. (1967) contend that a pathogenic 
double-bind can only be broken by a countering double-bind. 
A pathogenic double-bind places a person in a ''no-win" 
situation; for example, consider the parent who complains 
that her child does not love her, but rejects the child's 
displays of affection. Now consider the bind that a client 
is placed in when the therapist employs a paradoxical 
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intervention. Psychotherapy is presumably intended to 
effect positive changes in the client's life, but the 
therapist tells him/her not to change. Watzlawick et al. 
(1967) contend that this places the client in a therapeutic 
double-bind, a "no-lose" situation. That is, when a 
therapist prescribes a client's symptom, the client can 
respond in one of two ways (each of which leads to gaining 
control over the problem). If the client disobeys the 
therapist's directive, then the symptom disappears; and 
if the client performs the symptom, thens/he gains 
volitional control over what was formerly perceived to 
be an involuntary action. This gives the locus of symptom 
control to the client and O'Connell (1983) asserts that 
this is the most important effect of symptom prescription. 
Indications and Contraindications for the Use of Paradoxical 
Interventions 
A survey of the literature on paradoxical interventions 
reveals that many therapists deem these techniques 
appropriate only after more straightforward approaches 
have proven ineffective (e.g., Fischer et al., 1981). 
They are typically regarded as last resort methods reserved 
for use against chronic patterns of resistance (Papp, 1979). 
Clients who fit the descriptions of "therapist-killers" 
(Weeks & L'Abate, 1982) and "help-rejecting complainers" 
(Greenberg, 1973) have been suggested as suitable candidates 
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for paradoxical interventions. 
In order to reduce the apparent risks associated with 
discouraging positive client change, a number of client 
types and problems have been put forward as contraindicating 
the use of paradoxical interventions. Papp (1979), for 
example, says that paradoxical methods should not be 
employed in crisis situations, incest, child abuse, or 
with clients having suicidal or homicidal ideations. Others 
would add that paradoxical interventions are too risky 
with extremely suggestible clients (Rohrbaugh, Tennen, 
Press, & White, 1981), borderline personalities (Greenberg 
& Pies, 1983), antisocial personalities, and paranoid 
schizophrenics (Weeks & L'Abate, 1982). However, Fay (1976) 
reports three cases in which paradoxical interventions 
were used successfully with paranoid schizophrenics. This 
is but one example of the contradictions that can be found 
in the literature as to when paradoxical techniques are 
appropriate. 
In contrast, Fraser (1984) contends that the use of 
paradoxical interventions should be determined much more 
idiographically. He argues that basing decisions regarding 
the use of paradoxical techniques upon diagnostic labels 
ignores the uniqueness of individual clients. Fraser 
maintains that paradoxical interventions should not be 
relegated to last ditch efforts to combat resistance; 
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instead, they should be among a therapist's initial 
alternatives in treatment planning. Further, O'Connell 
(1983) believes symptom prescription is best used in the 
initial therapy session in order to give the client 
something to do toward solving his/her problem immediately 
and to cast the therapist in his/her proper role as an 
expert who knows best how to help the client. 
Research on the Efficacy of Paradoxical Interventions 
Seltzer (1986) lists over 80 problems that have been 
treated paradoxically--from anorexia to marital problems 
to writers block. However, much of the literature on the 
efficacy of paradoxical interventions involves clinical 
anecdotes rather than empirical evidence. DeBord (1989) 
reviewed the 25 clinical outcome studies that appeared 
in the psychological literature from 1980 to 1987 and found 
that 23 (92%) reported some degree of positive outcome--none 
indicated any adverse effects. But the designs of only 
12 (48%) of these studies included both a control group 
and an objective outcome measure; so half of these studies 
lacked two of the most basic features of empirical research. 
In addition, two separate meta-analyses have been 
performed on the existing controlled outcome studies. 
Hill (1987) examined 15 such studies (with the presenting 
problems of insomnia, depression, agoraphobia, 
procrastination, and stress) which appeared in the 
9 
professional literature between 1979 and 1985. Hill 
concluded that paradoxical interventions were consistently 
and significantly more effective than were non-paradoxical 
interventions. However, Shoham-Salomon and Rosenthal's 
(1987) inspection of 12 of the same data sets led them 
to a more conservative conclusion--that paradoxical 
interventions were equally as effective as conventional 
treatments. Nevertheless, they also judged that paradoxical 
interventions produced greater therapeutic change than 
other types of treatment with more severe cases as well 
as one month after termination. These two meta-analyses 
lend support to the contention that, at least in some cases, 
paradoxical interventions are a viable treatment option. 
Even so, the use of these controversial methods raises 
difficult ethical problems. 
Ethical Questions Regarding the Use of Paradoxical 
Interventions 
Because there is not necessarily any relationship 
between what is therapeutically efficacious and what is 
ethical, the ethical dilemmas that paradoxical interventions 
raise will now be examined. Critics of these methods 
contend that no matter what the outcome research might 
indicate about the efficacy of such techniques, the ethical 
problems that they raise should take precedence in decisions 
about their use (Whan, 1983). These critics would say 
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that paradoxical techniques are inherently unethical and 
should not be used under any circumstances. On the other 
hand, it has been argued that the ethical considerations 
regarding their use do not differ significantly from those 
of other therapeutic modalities (Brown & Slee, 1986; 
Hunsley, 1988). Thus, Deschenes and Shepperson (1983) 
assert that whether or not a paradoxical intervention is 
unethical depends not on the nature of the technique itself, 
but on its particular application by a specific therapist. 
So the context in which a paradoxical intervention is 
delivered must be examined in order to make judgments 
regarding its ethicality. Certainly, a therapist's use 
of symptom prescription can be presented to a client using 
varying degrees of deception and informed consent. Since 
deception and a lack of informed consent have historically 
accompanied the use of paradoxical interventions (Haley, 
1987), these two ethical problems will be given further 
consideration. 
Paradoxical Interventions and Deception 
Paradoxical interventions are often criticized as 
techniques that involve the deception of clients. For 
example, consider symptom prescription whereby clients 
are often instructed to continue the problematic behavior 
in order that they may learn more about the causes of the 
problem. Generally, the therapist is not concerned about 
11 
the problem's causes, this is just the most effective method 
of gaining the client's compliance with the directive. 
On a semantic level, Haley (1987) cautiously endorses the 
use of "benevolent lies" in therapy, and questions whether 
"deceit" is a meaningful concept in the context of 
psychotherapy. To Haley, if the use of deception seems 
important to facilitate progress in therapy, then that 
is sufficient justification for its use. But Whan (1983) 
wonders where the line can be drawn once any degree of 
deception becomes acceptable on the grounds that it may 
be therapeutically efficacious. 
One problem with the use of deception in employing 
symptom prescription is that therapy becomes paternalistic. 
Lindley (1987) contends that "strategic communication" 
(such as that described in the preceding example) lacks 
a "truth-centered motive," so it is therefore disrespectful 
and wrong because it assaults the autonomy of clients. 
Moreover, in the case of symptom prescription, use of 
deception assumes a certain level of incompetence on the 
part of the client which justifies active intervention 
to serve what the therapist perceives to be the client's 
best interests. Consequently, such use of deception tips 
the balance of power even more toward the therapist. If 
it can be granted that the possession of accurate (versus 
inaccurate) knowledge translates into increased power in 
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a relationship, then deception adds to the power of the 
deceiver and diminishes that of the deceived (Bok, 1978). 
In addition to problems related to paternalism and 
therapist power, there is the pragmatic concern of 
maintaining the client's trust. As Bok (1978) points out, 
the most fundamental concern of any person seeking the 
help of another is whether they can trust the person whose 
aid they seek. Ultimately, then, trust is the foundation 
of the therapeutic relationship and a therapist's use of 
deception would seem to violate that trust. In addition 
to the possible damage to a therapist's credibility that 
deception involves, the therapist may be forced into telling 
more lies in order to cover for earlier ones. This is 
a problem particularly in close relationships, such as 
therapy, where it is unlikely that one lie will suffice 
(Bok, 1978). To illustrate with the example of symptom 
prescription mentioned previously, some practitioners (e.g., 
Fisch et al., 1982; Haley, 1987) would urge this therapist 
to act surprised if the client "spontaneously" improved 
following this directive. 
Three analogue studies have explored criticisms that 
paradoxical interventions may have detrimental effects 
on the therapeutic relationship. Conoley and Beard (1984) 
found that both symptom prescription and nondirective 
interventions can be delivered in ways that are either 
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high or low in perceived empathy, warmth, and genuineness. 
These researchers also found no differences between symptom 
prescription and nondirective interventions in terms of 
perceived attractiveness or trustworthiness, though symptom 
prescription was rated as higher in expertness. In another 
study, Perrin and Dowd (1986) found that symptom 
prescription was seen as more "tricky" and "confusing" 
than non-paradoxical techniques; however, this did not 
adversely affect subjects' perceptions of the therapist's 
willingness or ability to help. Finally, McMillan and 
Johnson (1990) found that a counselor who implemented 
cognitive-behavioral interventions was rated as more expert, 
attractive, and trustworthy than one who delivered 
paradoxical interventions (with or without an explanation 
of this strategy). 
Certainly no final conclusions can be reached on the 
basis of the results of three studies whose results conflict 
as much as these do, but these findings do lead one to 
question whether paradoxical interventions have the negative 
effects on the therapeutic relationship that their critics 
expect. This issue is clouded by the fact that some 
therapists who use paradoxical interventions (e.g., Weeks 
& L'Abate, 1982) speak of the benefits of less than 
completely positive relationships in mobilizing resistance 
to paradoxical directives--thereby accomplishing the goals 
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of therapy. However, others such as O'Connell (1983) 
emphasize the importance of a strong, sincere therapeutic 
relationship in the use of paradoxical interventions. 
Further, there is the perennial question of how important 
the therapeutic relationship is in terms of accomplishing 
the goals of therapy--is it necessary or sufficient? 
Paradoxical Interventions and Informed Consent 
Use of deception in therapy is not consistent with 
the client's right to informed consent. The Ethical 
Principles of Psychologists (APA, 1990) require that 
therapists provide their clients with adequate information 
so that clients may make informed decisions regarding 
participation in therapy. At its core this means that 
clients must understand and agree to the treatment methods 
employed in their psychotherapy (Weeks & L'Abate, 1982). 
The philosophical significance of informed consent, 
like deception, has to do with the relative power of the 
therapist in relation to the client. If it can be assumed 
that self-disclosure increases the power of the listener 
and decreases that of the speaker (Bok, 1983), then 
therapists have great power in their relationships with 
clients as self-revelation typically flows in only one 
direction. Additionally, if the therapist fails to disclose 
the nature and purpose of the methods used in therapy the 
client's power is diminished still further. Seeking to 
15 
balance the distribution of power both consumers and a 
number of therapists have come to stress the importance 
of more client participation in the decision-making of 
therapy (Coyne & Widiger, 1978). Corey, Corey, and Callanan 
(1984) contend that therapists have a responsibility to 
educate clients of their rights because therapy is a novel 
situation with which many clients are unfamiliar; it should 
be de-mystified as much as possible in order to facilitate 
individual autonomy. 
Everstine, Everstine, Heymann, True, Frey, Johnson, 
and Seiden (1980) have outlined the information that they 
consider prerequisite to informed consent: (1) an 
explanation of the procedures of therapy and their purposes, 
(2) the role and qualifications of the therapist, (3) any 
risks and/or benefits to be expected from therapy, (4) 
alternatives to therapy, (5) a statement that questions 
about the procedures of therapy will be answered at any 
time, and (6) a statement that the client can terminate 
therapy at any time. However, Brown and Slee (1986) note 
that this outline is historically more closely associated 
with medical practice than psychotherapy and that such 
specific information is usually not available for any method 
of therapy. The risks and consequences of therapy and 
its alternatives are so wide-ranging and uncertain that 
they prohibit ''full" presentation, thus fully informed 
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consent (Widiger & Rorer, 1984). To further complicate 
matters, there is widespread disagreement regarding what 
degree of disclosure--from a general orientation to 
psychotherapy, to the therapist's preferred theory, to 
descriptions of the specific interventions of therapy--is 
required in order to obtain an adequate degree of informed 
consent (Kolko & Milan, 1986). 
In addition to the practical problems involved in 
implementing informed consent with any sort of 
psychotherapeutic method, there are theoretical problems 
specific to paradoxical interventions. For example, in 
classic double-bind theory if the bind is commented upon 
it can be escaped (Watzlawick et al., 1967), making the 
intervention impotent--and there is empirical evidence 
to support this contention. Hills et al. (1985) found 
that explaining the double-bind led to favorable evaluations 
of therapists, but diminished the efficacy of the 
intervention. In light of this problem, some (Kolko & 
Milan, 1986; Young, 1981-1982) have suggested that in the 
use of paradoxical interventions the client's consent not 
to be fully informed of the techniques to be used should 
be sought. Further, some who utilize paradoxical 
interventions point out that it would be impractical for 
any therapist to expose all the "machinery" of therapy 
to the client (Haley, 1987; Hunsley, 1988). Widiger and 
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Rorer (1984) conclude that it is not possible to have a 
single set of ethical principles that can be applied 
consistently across theoretical orientations; some 
ethical relativism is necessary. 
But even if the mental health professions came to 
accept this sort of ethical relativism, the legal profession 
and the larger society may not be as willing to approve 
of such a complicated solution. In our increasingly 
litigious society, it is not surprising that Henderson 
(1987) has warned that a therapist could be held liable 
for malpractice where informed consent has not been 
obtained. Thus, in view of the theoretical difficulties 
involved in fully informing clients of the purposes of 
paradoxical interventions and the seemingly illogical nature 
of such methods, Schmidt (1986) expresses concern that 
a therapist who uses them may be open to claims of 
malpractice. However, suits alleging negligence in 
psychotherapy are very rare (Appelbaum & Gutheil, 1991). 
In regard to the use of innovative therapies such as symptom 
prescription, Simon (1987) notes that potential legal 
problems hinge on whether informed consent has been obtained 
and whether a specific therapy represents a substantial 
departure from standard and accepted practice (i.e., at 
least a respectable minority of the profession uses similar 
methods and the therapy has been employed responsibly). 
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Simon goes on to say that if a particular mode of therapy 
is found to be "customary," then liability is usually 
precluded. Stromberg, Haggarty, Leibenluft, McMillian, 
Mishkim, Rubin, and Trilling (1988) know of no reported 
cases in which a psychotherapist has been held liable for 
negligent verbal therapy, but they do not rule out that 
possibility. They also caution that related claims of 
failing to take precautions against the possibility of 
a client harming him/herself or others are more likely 
to succeed. In the case of a directive technique, such 
as symptom prescription, establishing the conditions for 
legal liability may be more easily accomplished. For 
example, if a client worsens after a symptom has been 
prescribed, a jury is likely to have difficulty 
understanding why the therapist employed such a directive. 
In a 1983 case in California, a therapist was found 
negligent because she told a rather large woman to sit 
on her disobedient son in order to assert parental 
control--the client took this directive literally and sat 
on the boy until he died of suffocation (Cormier & Cormier, 
1985). 
Assumptions Underlying Therapy 
By now it seems clear that there are some fundamental 
differences between the conceptions of the therapeutic 
process that critics and proponents of these techniques 
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hold. Advocates of paradoxical interventions have an 
extremely pragmatic bent; they seem to be willing to use 
whatever approach works to produce change as quickly as 
possible. Not surprisingly, they do not hold to the 
traditional insight models of therapy that assume client 
self-understanding must precede significant change (Young, 
1981-1982). Watzlawick et al. (1967) argue that people 
often change without knowing why--insight is not a necessary 
or even a usual antecedent of change. For the therapist 
who uses paradoxical interventions change is the goal; 
insight is irrelevant. On the other hand, critics such 
as Martin (1986) say that paradoxical interventions may 
work in the short-term, but they will not help clients 
to maintain their gains or deal with related problems in 
the future--because they presumably have not understood 
the process of change. 
Henderson (1987) has noted that the increasing use 
of paradoxical interventions seems to be related to a 
shifting of responsibility for change in therapy from the 
client to the therapist. Incidentally, the label "symptom 
prescription" implies a doctor-patient relationship in 
which a professional provides a "cure" for the client's 
ailment. Further, Fisch et al. (1982) assert that the 
therapist is an "expert" whose responsibility it is to 
direct the course of treatment. They add that if the client 
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knew whats/he should do there would be no need for therapy. 
This represents another fundamental difference between 
the viewpoints of the critics and proponents of these 
techniques. Traditionally, with the responsibility for 
change resting with the client, therapy might continue 
for a long period of time without change in the client 
or the treatment approach in the hope that "resistance" 
or a "lack of motivation" might soon be overcome (Weeks 
& L'Abate, 1982). Haley (1987) contends that such an 
approach to therapy is more concerned with definitions 
of proper therapist behavior than it is with the task of 
helping clients solve their problems. Critics of 
paradoxical interventions would counter that directive 
methods promote dependency upon the therapist (Van Hoose 
& Kottler, 1985), which is diametrically opposed to their 
purpose of promoting the client's autonomy. 
Acceptability of Paradoxical Interventions 
As defined for the purposes of this study, 
acceptability referred to the subjective evaluation of 
a treatment procedure by an individual (Kazdin, 1980a, 
1980b; Witt & Elliott, 1985). That is, how much does a 
person like the treatment in question? Is it appropriate, 
fair, and reasonable given the client's problem? If the 
client likes the interventions used in his/her therapy 
then they will be more motivated to be actively involved 
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and change than if they find them objectionable. But 
perhaps a more fundamental question is the acceptability 
of an intervention to those who may implement them. Two 
such groups are psychotherapists and classroom teachers. 
Hirschmann and Sprenkle (1989) conducted a survey 
of the clinical members of the American Association for 
Marriage and Family Therapy. Seventy-six percent of the 
respondents were users of paradoxical interventions. (It 
should be noted that the field of marriage and family 
therapy is much more influenced by systemic theories than 
most other specializations within the broader field of 
psychotherapy. This may account for the high percentage 
of respondents who used paradoxical interventions.) They 
found users of these techniques to be more directive in 
their approach to therapy and less concerned with the 
ethical issues related to these interventions than their 
colleagues who did not employ paradoxical methods. However, 
they did not find non-users as a group to be averse to 
the use of paradoxical interventions by their colleagues. 
Hirschmann and Sprenkle concluded that paradoxical 
interventions were a part of the repertoire of the majority 
of marriage and family therapists, and that within that 
field they are viewed as effective and ethically acceptable 
techniques. 
Gavell, Frentz, and Kelley (1986) have conducted the 
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only other empirical study to address the acceptability 
of paradoxical interventions. These researchers examined 
the acceptability of these techniques in the context of 
altering the problem behavior of delinquent youth. Middle 
and high school teachers rated the acceptability of a 
symptom prescription that had previously been demonstrated 
to be effective by Kolko and Milan (1983). The Cavell 
et al. (1986) study included five treatment conditions--four 
of which involved the paradoxical intervention with 
different rationales for its use and one of which involved 
continuing a program of positive reinforcement that was 
reported to be ineffectual. The teachers in all four 
paradoxical intervention conditions rated this treatment 
as significantly less acceptable than did the group which 
rated the continuation of the unsuccessful program of 
reinforcement. Additionally, there was a significant 
difference in· acceptability ratings between the conditions 
employing a paradoxical intervention accompanied by a 
"paradoxical rationale'' (an explanation in terms of the 
adolescents likelihood of defying the paradoxical directive 
leading to a reduction of the problem behavior) and the 
one involving "no rationale.'' The latter was rated as 
less acceptable. These results raise questions about the 
acceptability of paradoxical interventions among secondary 
school teachers. 
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To summarize, the literature on paradoxical 
interventions has been selectively reviewed with particular 
attention to the ethical problems of deception and informed 
consent and this treatment's acceptability. Few studies 
prior to this one have examined the acceptability of 
paradoxical interventions to psychotherapists. This study 
employed a format somewhat analogous to an ethics review 
board; that is, a group of professionals made judgments 
as to whether a hypothetical colleague acted "acceptably" 
in employing a symptom prescription. The primary hypotheses 
of this study were that in regard to the context in which 
a symptom prescription is delivered, psychotherapists would 
rate the intervention as les~ acceptable when: (1) deception 
was involved, and (2) informed consent was not obtained. 
Secondary hypotheses also investigated were that 
psychotherapists would rate a symptom prescription as less 
acceptable whens/he: (1) did not claim systems as his/her 
primary theoretical orientation, (2) was less directive 
in his/her approach to psychotherapy, (3) placed more 
emphasis on insight as a requisite for change, and (4) 
displayed greater sensitivity to ethical considerations. 
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METHOD 
Procedure and Subjects 
Four hundred potential participants were randomly 
selected from the Clinical section of the directory of 
the Illinois Psychological Association (1989-1990). Each 
of these individuals was mailed a packet which included: 
a cover letter, a demographic questionnaire, one of four 
variations of a treatment vignette, two treatment 
acceptability measures, a reply envelope, and a postcard 
on which to request a copy of the results of the study. 
One hundred forty-four usable replies were obtained 
making the response rate 36%. A majority of the respondents 
indicated their primary theoretical orientation as eclectic 
(56%); other theories represented were psychodynamic (22%), 
cognitive (5%), humanistic (4%), behavioral (3%), systems 
(3%), other (3%), and 4% did not specify a theoretical 
orientation. The gender of the participants was fairly 
evenly distributed: 44% were female and 52% were male (4% 
did not indicate a gender). The mean age of the 
participants was 46.2 years (SD=l0.4). Additionally, the 
participants had an average of 13.4 years of post-degree 
therapy experience (SD=9.4) and an average of 22.5 
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client-hours per week (SD=l2.8). Based on these 
demographics, it seemed fair to assume that the participants 
were reasonably representative of the field and 
well-acquainted with the practice of psychotherapy. 
Materials 
Demographic questionnaire. In addition to the 
demographic information already reported, this questionnaire 
included five items relating to the participant's 
assumptions about psychotherapy (see Appendix A). Rated 
on a five-point Likert scale, these items addressed 
attitudes about directiveness (e.g., "The therapist--not 
the client--bears the primary responsibility for progress 
in therapy.''), the importance of insight (e.g., "There 
can be no significant change in therapy without the client 
first gaining insight."), and ethical considerations (e.g., 
"The use of a deceptive intervention cannot be justified 
by any amount of constructive change."). 
Treatment vignettes. The case descriptions used in 
this investigation (adapted from Dowd & Milne, 1986; see 
Appendix B) consisted of five paragraphs: (1) problem, 
(2) case conceptualization, (3) consent to treatment, (4) 
symptom prescription, and (S) the rationale given for the 
intervention. Paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 were the same for 
all four experimental conditions. The first paragraph 
described a young man who sought counseling because of 
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his compulsive vomiting and anxiety in dating situations. 
The second paragraph detailed the therapist's 
conceptualization of the client's problems and plan for 
intervention in terms of placing the client in a therapeutic 
double-bind by means of prescribing his vomiting. The 
fourth paragraph outlined the therapist's implementation 
of the symptom prescription. The third and fifth paragraphs 
varied according to the experimental group of the subject. 
The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 
four conditions of the study's 2 X 2 factorial design: 
low deception/low informed consent (n=33), high deception/ 
low informed consent (~=31), low deception/high informed 
consent (n=42), and high deception/high informed consent 
(n=38). The manner in which the therapist described in 
the vignettes sought and obtained the client's consent 
to treatment, and the rationale that was given for the 
symptom prescription determined the four experimental 
conditions. The specific components of the vignettes 
relevant to the four conditions are described in the 
following paragraphs. 
Low informed consent. In this condition the therapist 
told the client that he must agree to follow the therapist's 
instructions exactly--without asking any questions--before 
he will be told how to solve his problem. The client then 
gave his consent to proceed. (vignettes 1 and 2) 
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High informed consent. In this condition the therapist 
told the client that he will be asked to continue vomiting 
for awhile, though it might seem strange or be unpleasant. 
The therapist offered to answer any questions that the 
young man might have at any time during treatment. The 
client then gave his consent to proceed. 
and 4) 
(vignettes 3 
Low deception. In this condition the therapist 
disclosed to the client the rationale of the therapeutic 
double-bind that led to the formulation of the symptom 
prescription. (vignettes 1 and 3) 
High deception. In this condition the rationale that 
the client was given for the symptom prescription was that 
it would increase his awareness of the causes of his 
vomiting so that a plan to eliminate it could be developed. 
(vignettes 2 and 4) 
A counseling psychologist unfamiliar with this study 
evaluated the four treatment vignettes in terms of their 
levels of informed consent and deception and correctly 
identified all four treatment conditions. 
Acceptability measures. Two different instruments 
were used in this study to measure treatment acceptability, 
the Treatment Evaluation Inventory--Short Form (TEI-SF; 
Kelley, Heffer, Gresham, & Elliott, 1989) and the 
Intervention Rating Profile-15 (IRP-15; Witt & Elliott, 
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1985). 
The TEI-SF (see Appendix C) is a 9-item scale which 
asks respondents to rate various aspects of the 
acceptability of an intervention used to treat a child's 
problem on a 5-point Likert scale. This instrument is 
a revision of Kazdin's (1980a) original TEI. A coefficient 
alpha estimate of the internal consistency of the TEI-SF 
has been reported by Kelley et al. (1989) as .85. These 
authors also provide validity data in the form of the 
TEI-SF's ability to discriminate among treatments at the 
.01 level of significance. 
The IRP-15 (see Appendix C) is a 15-item scale which 
also requires subjects to evaluate several aspects of the 
acceptability of a procedure used to treat a child's 
behavior problem using a 6-point Likert scale. The IRP-15 
is a revision of the original 20-item IRP (Witt & Martens, 
1983) with a simplified factor structure (the original 
scale had one primary factor and four secondary factors, 
while the IRP-15 has a single factor). Elliott, Turco, 
and Gresham (1987) report a .98 coefficient alpha estimate 
of the internal consistency of the IRP-15. Regarding 
validity, several studies (Elliott et al., 1987; Hall & 
Didier, 1987; Hall & Wahrman, 1988) have reported that 
the IRP-15 effectively discriminated among interventions 
in terms of acceptability. 
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Since both of these measures were designed specifically 
for the evaluation of behavioral interventions with children 
in school and institutional settings, the following minor 
changes in the wording of these measures were deemed 
appropriate for this investigation. "Child," "teacher," 
"classroom," and "problem behavior" or "behavior problem" 
were replaced by "client," "therapist," "therapy," and 
"problem," respectively. 
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RESULTS 
Factor Analysis 
Because the IRP-15 and the TEI-SF have not seen 
widespread use, it seemed important to verify their 
psychometric properties. However, the statistical package 
used in this study (SYSTAT-Version 4.1; Wilkinson, 1989) 
will not compute coefficient alpha estimates of reliability, 
so a decision was made to factor analyze the IRP-15 and 
the TEI-SF. This was done to develop more stable and 
homogeneous measures of treatment acceptability for the 
purposes of this study. 
The 24 items composing the IRP-15 and the TEI-SF were 
subjected to a principal components analysis with varimax 
rotation. The criteria used in determining the number 
of factors were: the factors with eigenvalues greater than 
one, the scree test, the amount of variance accounted for 
by the factor solution, and the meaningfulness of the factor 
solution. Two factors emerged which combined to account 
for 71% of the total variance. These components 
approximated the factor structures reported for the 
unifactorial IRP-15 (Hall & Didier, 1987; Hall & Wahrman, 
1988) and the duofactorial TEI-SF (Kelley et al., 1989). 
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Table 1 reports the items and their loadings on each factor. 
Factor 1 was composed of 14 items from the IRP-15 
and 6 items from the TEI-SF with item loadings ranging 
from .90 to .73. This factor accounted for 60% of the 
total variance. Factor 1 was named General Acceptability 
as it seemed to reflect a variety issues regarding the 
appropriateness of an intervention, including: willingness 
to use a treatment, willingness to recommend a treatment 
to colleagues, judgments of an intervention's sensibility, 
perceptions of a treatment's potential efficacy for a 
particular problem and additional ones, and perceptions 
of colleagial reactions to the type of intervention 
described. 
Factor 2 was composed of 3 items from the TEI-SF and 
1 item from the IRP-15 and accounted for 11% of the total 
variance. The item loadings on this factor ranged from 
.71 to .58. The items making up this factor focused on 
the acceptability of an intervention in light of the ethical 
considerations of consent to treatment and the possibility 
of negative side effects for the client. Factor 2 was 
named Ethical Acceptability as its items seemed to relate 
to an element of the broader General Acceptability factor. 
As might be expected, the two factors were found to be 
moderately correlated (r=.47; see Table 2). 
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TABLE 1 
Factor Loadings for the Intervention Rating Profile-IS and the Treatment Evaluation Inventory-Short Form 
with Varimax Rotation 
Factor 1: Acceptability 
14. I would suggest the use of this intervention to other therapists. 
112. This intervention is reasonable for the problem described. 
13. This intervention should prove effective in changing the client's problem. 
17. I would be willing to use this intervention in a therapy setting. 
Tl. I find this treatment to be an acceptable way of dealing with the client's problem. 
T9. Overall, I have a positive reaction to this treatment. 
113. I liked the procedures used in this intervention. 
TS. I believe this treatment is likely to be effective. 
T2. I would be willing to use this procedure if I had to change the client's problem. 
T4. I like the procedures used in this treatment. 
Il. This would be an acceptable intervention for the client's problem. 
IS. The client's problem is severe enough to warrant use of this intervention. 
110. This intervention is consistent with those I have used in therapy settings. 
114. This intervention was a good way to handle the client's problem. 
IlS. Overall, this intervention would be beneficial for the client. 
Ill. The intervention was a fair way to handle the client's problem. 
19. This intervention would be appropriate for a variety of clients. 
16. Most therapists would find this intervention suitable for the problem described. 
12. Most therapists would find this intervention appropriate for problems in addition to 
the one described. 
T7. I believe this treatment is likely to result in permanent improvement. 
Factor 2: Ethical Issues 
T3. I believe that it would be acceptable to use this treatment without a client's consent. 
18. This intervention would not result in negative side effects for the client. 
T6. I [do not] believe the client will experience discomfort during the treatment. 
TB. I believe it would be acceptable to use this treatment with individuals who cannot 
choose treatments for themselves. 
Total Variance Explained 
Factor 
1 2 
.90 .12 
.88 .21 
.88 .06 
.88 .18 
.88 .20 
.88 .21 
.87 .18 
.87 .16 
.87 .23 
.84 .25 
.84 .20 
.84 .24 
.83 .13 
.82 .35 
.81 .35 
• 77 .41 
.76 .25 
• 76 · .07 
.75 -.OS 
.73 .24 
.20 • 71 
.37 .66 
-.20 .59 
.47 .58 
.60 .11 
TABLE 2 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Age 
2. Years experience .78** 
3. Hours per week .oo .03 
4. Attitude 1 .14 .13 -.07 
L,J 5. Attitude 2 .12 .04 .23 -.07 
.p.. 6. Attitude 3 .16 .08 -.04 -.20 .19 
7. Attitude 4 • 28 .28 -.12 .01 .01 -.10 
8. Attitude 5 -.02 -.14 -.24 .oo -.01 .37* .02 
9. Factor 1 -.17 -.09 .06 .08 -.19 -.43-ff .13 -.14 
10. Factor 2 -.13 -.06 .07 -.03 -.03 -.21 .18 -.24 .47** 
n=107 
Using Bonferroni correction method: 
*2_<.05 
**2_<.001 
Descriptive Statistics 
Means and standard deviations on the dependent 
variables of General Acceptability and Ethical Acceptability 
by the grouping variables of treatment condition, gender, 
and theoretical orientation are presented in Table 3. 
The full sample means on General Acceptability (2.70) and 
Ethical Acceptability (2.31) were slightly below the 
midpoints of 2.85 and 2.63, respectively. No significant 
differences among the dependent variables were found based 
on these independent variables, with one exception. When 
the psychodynamic and eclectic groups were compared across 
treatment conditions (the cell sizes of the other 
theoretical orientations were deemed too small for reliable 
comparisons), it was found that the psychodynamic 
therapists' ratings were significantly lower on General 
Acceptability than those of the eclectic therapists, ~(111) 
=2.475, ~<.05. 
Analysis of Variance and Analysis of Covariance 
The primary purpose of this study was to examine the 
effects of using deception and informed consent on 
therapists' ratings of the acceptability of symptom 
prescription. This was accomplished using a 2 (low 
deception/high deception) X 2 (low informed consent/high 
informed consent) analysis of variance. However, no 
significant main or interaction effects were found on either 
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TABLE 3 
Summary Statistics for Factor 1 and Factor 2 by Treatment, Gender, 
and Theoretical Orientation 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
M SD 
Treatment Group 
M SD 
Low Deception/Low Consent (n=33) 2.47 .95 2.29 .78 
High Deception/Low Consent (n=31) 2.66 1.14 2.33 • 75 
Low Deception/High Consent (n=42) 2. 77 1.09 2.24 .79 
High Deception/High Consent (n=38) 2.86 1.20 2.39 • 77 
Gender 
Female (n=63) 2.50 1.05 2.24 .80 
Male (n=75) 2.87 1.14 2.37 .75 
Unspecified (n=6) 2.75 .96 2.29 .80 
Theoretical Orientation 
Behavioral (n=4) 3.19 1.26 3.06 .83 
Cognitive (n=7) 2.28 1.11 1.96 .73 
Humanistic (n=6) 2.87 1.02 2.79 .89 
Psychodynamic (n=32) 2.28* 1.06 2.42 .81 
Systems (n=4) 3.45 1.67 2.25 1.46 
Eclectic C.!!.=80) 2.85* 1.10 2.27 • 70 
Other (n=5) 2.78 .90 1.92 .41 
Unspecified (n=6) 2.46 .69 1.96 .73 
All Groups (N=144) 2.70 1.09 2.31 • 77 
*Theoretical differences were found to be statistically significant, 
_£<.05. 
Note: Factor 1 was composed of fourteen items ranked on a six point 
scale and six items ranked on a five point scale (range=l.00-5.70). 
Factor 2 was composed of three items ranked on a five point scale and 
one item ranked on a six point scale (range=l.00-5.25). 
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General Acceptability or Ethical Acceptability (see Table 
4). In addition, a 2 X 2 analysis of covariance was 
performed using theoretical orientation as the covariate 
(psychodynamic or eclectic). Table 5 shows that this 
strategy also failed to yield any significant main or 
interaction effects on General Acceptability or Ethical 
Acceptability. Therefore, the context in which the symptom 
prescription was delivered was not found to effect 
psychotherapists' ratings of the intervention's 
acceptability. 
Multiple Regression Analyses 
A secondary focus of this study was examine whether 
therapists' attitudes would be related to their ratings 
of the acceptability of symptom prescription. To this 
end, separate stepwise multiple regressions were employed 
using the therapy attitude items on the demographics 
questionnaire (see Appendix A) to predict General and 
Ethical Acceptability ratings for each condition. Before 
the results of this procedure are described, it should 
be noted that the third attitude variable (use of deception 
cannot be justified) evidenced a significant correlation 
with both the fifth attitude variable (no intervention 
should be used without informed consent) and the General 
Acceptability factor (£=.37, E<.05, and £=-.43, E<.001, 
respectively; see Table 2). 
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TABLE 4 
2 X 2 Analysis of Variance Effects of Deception and Informed Consent on Factor 1 and 
Factor 2 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
ss F .E. ss F .E. 
Deception .68 .56 .46 Deception .35 .58 .45 
Consent 2.22 1.82 .18 Consent .oo .oo .98 
Deception X Consent .11 .09 • 76 Deception X Consent .11 .19 .67 
N=144 
TABLE 5 
2 X 2 Analysis of Covariance Effects of Deception and Informed Consent on Factor 1 and 
Factor 2 using Theoretical Orientation (Psychodynamic and Eclectic) as Covariate 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
ss F .E. ss F .E. 
Theory 6.66 5.49 .02 Theory .46 .84 .36 
Deception .10 .08 .78 Deception .06 .11 .74 
Consent .OS .04 .85 Consent .15 • 27 .61 
Deception X Consent .24 .20 .66 Deception X Consent .04 .08 .78 
n=l12 
Regression of the General Acceptability factor onto 
the five attitude variables, by treatment condition, 
revealed only the "deception cannot be justified" item 
as a significant predictor (see Table 6). This item was 
a predictor of General Acceptability in the low 
deception/low informed consent (R 2 =.40; ,E_<.001), low 
deception/high informed consent (R
2
=.10; .E_<.05), and high 
deception/high informed consent (R 2 =.15; .£<. 05) treatment 
groups. However, none of the attitude variables 
significantly predicted General Acceptability ratings in 
the high deception/low informed consent group. Finally, 
when all four treatment groups were combined this attitude 
variable accounted for 16% of the variance (_£<.001) in 
General Acceptability ratings. In each case in which it 
was identified as a significant predictor, the "deception 
cannot be justified" item was negatively related to General 
Acceptability. 
The stepwise multiple regression procedure yielded 
a much less consistent set of predictors when the Ethical 
Acceptability ratings were regressed onto the attitude 
variables by treatment condition (see Table 6). The 
attitude predictors which reached statistical significance 
fluctuated among treatment conditions. In the low 
deception/low informed consent condition, the "no 
intervention should be employed without informed consent" 
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TABLE 6 
Summar! of SteEwise Regression Analises Using Attitude Variables to Predict 
Factor 1 and Factor 2 
Factor 1 
Group Predictor R2 F df .£. 
Low Deception/Low Consent Attitude 3 .40 19.25 (1,29) .oo 
High Deception/Low Consent 
Low Deception/High Consent Attitude 3 .10 4.15 (1,39) .05 
High Deception/High Consent Attitude 3 .15 6.27 (1,35) .02 
All Conditions Attitude 3 .16 26.30 (1,134) .oo 
.i:-- Psychodynamic Attitudes 3+2 .55 16.83 (2,28) .oo 
0 Eclectic Attitude 3 .06 5.18 (1,76) .03 
Factor 2 
Group Predictor(s) R2 F df .£. 
Low Deception/Low Consent Attitude 5 .20 7.13 (1,29) .01 
High Deception/Low Consent Attitude 3 .24 7.76 (1,25) .01 
Low Deception/High Consent Attitude 4 .12 5.09 (1, 39) .03 
High Deception/High Consent Attitude 5 .13 4.87 (1, 34) .03 
All Conditions Attitudes 3+4 .11 7.89 (2,133) .oo 
Psychodynamic Attitude 3 .17 6.10 (1,29) .02 
Eclectic Attitude 5 .08 6.23 ( 1, 77) .02 
Note: alpha-to-enter and alpha-to-remove= .OS 
item accounted for 20% of the variance in Ethical 
Acceptability ratings (~<.05). In the high deception/low 
informed consent condition, the "deception cannot be 
justified" item accounted for 24% of the variance in the 
dependent variable (~<.05). For the low deception/high 
informed consent group, the "use the intervention which 
produces change" item accounted for 12% of the variance 
in the dependent measure (~<.05). Finally, in the high 
deception/high informed consent condition, the "no 
intervention should be employed without informed consent" 
item accounted for 13% of the variance in Ethical 
Acceptability ratings (~<.05). When all four treatment 
conditions were grouped together, the "deception cannot 
be justified" and "use the intervention which produces 
change most efficiently" items emerged as significant 
predictors combining to account for 11% of the variance 
in Ethical Acceptability ratings (~<.01). When the 
"deception cannot be justified" and "no intervention should 
be employed without informed consent" items were identified 
as significant predictors, they were negatively related 
to Ethical Acceptability. In contrast, the "use the 
intervention which produces change" item was positively 
related to Ethical Acceptability. 
Because of the significant differences in the General 
Acceptability ratings of psychodynamic and eclectic 
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therapists and the inconsistent set of predictors identified 
for Ethical Acceptability, additional stepwise regression 
procedures were performed. The psychodynamic and eclectic 
groups were considered across treatment conditions using 
the attitude variables as predictors (see Table 6). For 
the psychodynamic group, General Acceptability ratings 
were negatively related to the "deception cannot be 
justified" and "no real change without insight" items 
(R 2 =.55; .£_<.001). Only the "deception cannot be justified" 
item was related to Ethical Acceptability for the 
psychodynamic group (R 2 =.17; .£_<.05). For the eclectic 
therapists, the "deception cannot be justified" item emerged 
as negatively related to General Acceptability (l 2 =.06; 
.£_<.05), and the "no intervention should be employed without 
informed consent" item related negatively to Ethical 
Acceptability (R
2
=.08; .£_<.05). 
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DISCUSSION 
Use of Deception and Informed Consent and the Acceptability 
of Symptom Prescription 
The primary question this study addressed was: Does 
the use of deception and/or informed consent in the delivery 
of a symptom prescription affect its acceptability to 
therapists? However, the results of this study did not 
support the conclusion that the presence (or absence) of 
deception and/or informed consent significantly impact 
the General or Ethical Acceptability of a symptom 
prescription. Further, when theoretical differences were 
taken into consideration, no differences were found in 
the acceptability of symptom prescription when the levels 
of deception and informed consent were manipulated. 
Beyond the real possibility that the use of deception 
and informed consent do not significantly influence the 
acceptability of symptom prescription, there are at least 
two plausible reasons for this study's lack of conclusive 
findings. First, because no manipulation check was included 
in the study, it is not certain that the subjects perceived 
the treatment conditions as sufficiently distinct in regard 
to the independent variables. Second, the particular 
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symptom prescription involved (i.e., instructing the client 
to vomit) may have prevented any differences based on the 
treatment conditions from being detected; perhaps 
instructing the client to vomit was equally objectionable 
to the therapists across treatment conditions. 
So the questions of whether and how the use of 
deception and informed consent affect the acceptability 
of symptom prescription remain unanswered. But on the 
basis of the foregoing, one might tentatively conclude 
(realizing the dangers of arguing from null results), that 
we should look elsewhere in trying to understand why 
paradoxical interventions are so controversial. Perhaps 
the key is whether paradoxical interventions can be 
accommodated by one's primary theoretical orientation--an 
idea for which this study provides preliminary support. 
However, this study also identified a relationship between 
therapists' attitudes about the use of deception and lack 
of informed consent and the acceptability of the symptom 
prescription. 
Assumptions about Psychotherapy and Acceptability of Symptom 
Prescription 
The secondary question this study addressed was: 
What are some of the attitudes that therapists hold which 
relate to their judgments of a symptom prescription's 
acceptability? The results of the study allow this question 
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to be answered more conclusively. General Acceptability 
was related to theoretical orientation and attitudes about 
the use of deception and of the role of insight in therapy. 
Ethical Acceptability was associated with attitudes about 
the use of deception and informed consent, as well as with 
an attitude which says essentially "the end justifies the 
means." 
The relationship between theoretical orientation and 
General Acceptability was not surprising. Psychodynamic 
therapists found the symptom prescription to be 
significantly less acceptable than did the eclectic 
therapists. These theoretical differences could be 
anticipated as the traditional psychodynamic therapist 
who employs an insight-oriented approach to therapy would 
be expected to react negatively to the directive nature 
of symptom prescription. While those therapists who choose 
to call themselves "eclectic" could be expected to be more 
pragmatic and flexible in their modes of intervention. 
Another attitude variable which emerged as related 
to General Acceptability of symptom prescription was the 
"deception cannot be justified by any amount of change" 
item. This item was negatively related to acceptability 
so that the more strongly a subject agreed with this 
statement, the less acceptable the intervention was to 
him/her, and vice versa. However, this attitude variable 
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did not relate to General Acceptability in the high 
deception/low informed consent condition. This condition 
should have been the most objectionable leading the 
deception item, and perhaps the consent item, to be 
predictive, but that was obviously not the case. Perhaps 
many of the subjects in this condition reasoned that a 
symptom prescription could only be effective in a high 
deception/low informed consent context--which is consistent 
with the classic double-bind theory. This could have led 
to their attitudes about the use of deception and informed 
consent being less predictive of acceptability than they 
would normally have been. 
Finally, for the psychodynamic therapists, the attitude 
that insight is prerequisite to significant change combined 
with the deception variable to account for over half of 
the variance in General Acceptability. This finding was 
not surprising because the client's development of insight 
is seen as so very fundamental by psychodynamically-oriented 
therapists, but is usually ignored in the use of symptom 
prescription. However, the key attitude related to General 
Acceptability across groups was that regarding deception 
as it appeared once again--this time as the only signficant 
predictor for the eclectic therapists. 
The attitude variables related to the secondary factor 
of Ethical Acceptability were less consistent and more 
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diverse making their interpretation more problematic. 
When all the treatment conditions were grouped together, 
the deception attitude was again the most significant 
predictor, but this time in tandem with the positively 
related therapeutic pragmatism item (use the intervention 
which produces change). That is, the more pragmatic the 
therapist indicated s/he was, the more Ethically Acceptable 
s/he rated the symptom prescription (and vice versa). 
In addition to its role in predicting Ethical Acceptability 
for the entire sample, the therapeutic pragmatism item 
was related to Ethical Acceptability in the low 
deception/high informed consent condition. However, it 
is worth noting that this treatment condition should be 
the least objectionable, and so the positive relationship 
between this attitude and acceptability ratings is not 
very surprising. 
The deception item was the only one related to Ethical 
Acceptability in the high deception/low informed consent 
condition. Interesting to note, this is the only condition 
in which this attitude was not predictive of General 
Acceptability. These results show the "deception cannot 
be justified" item to be the one most consistently related 
to acceptability across treatment groups and dependent 
measures. It is also interesting to note that the 
therapists' attitu~es about deception were related to 
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acceptability, while actual differences in the use of 
deception were not. Perhaps this is but another example 
of the discrepancies that are often found between persons' 
attitudes and their presumably related behaviors (Myers, 
1987). 
Finally, in both the low deception/low informed consent 
and high deception/high informed consent conditions the 
informed consent item (no intervention should be used 
without informed consent) emerged as a negatively related 
predictor. That is, those who agreed with this item tended 
to judge the symptom prescription as less Ethically 
Acceptable (and vice versa). Once again, the nature of 
the relationship between this attitude and acceptability 
is not surprising. However, offering reasons for why this 
attitude emerged as predictive in these treatment conditions 
involves mere speculation. One could surmise that in the 
low deception/low informed consent condition that since 
consent rather than deception was at issue, it makes sense 
that the consent attitude was related to Ethical 
Acceptability. However, such an interpretation does not 
leave room to explain with consistency why this attitude 
variable was predictive in the high deception/high informed 
consent condition. One might note the significance of 
the correlation between the deception and consent attitude 
variables, then proceed to say that it was merely chance 
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which led the consent item to be predictive rather than 
the deception item for this particular condition. But 
such an understanding leads to ever greater inconsistencies 
with the interpretations of the other treatment conditions. 
Finally, Ethical Acceptability was related to the 
deception attitude variable for the psychodynamic therapists 
and the the informed consent attitude for the eclectic 
therapists. These findings serve to reinforce the large 
role that attitudes about deception and informed consent 
played in determining the Ethical Acceptability of symptom 
prescription. 
Limitations of this Study 
The weaknesses of this study can be divided into two 
groups, those bearing primarily on internal validity and 
those restricting external validity. Two limitations in 
regard to internal validity have been discussed earlier, 
but their importance bears repeating. First, because there 
was no manipulation check on the deception and informed 
consent independent variables included in the study proper, 
it is not certain whether the treatment conditions were 
perceived as being sufficiently distinct. Second, there 
are questions about the specific symptom prescription used 
in the treatment vignettes and how that may have led to 
null results in regard to the primary questions this study 
sought to address. Both of these limitations could have 
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been addressed more fully by the inclusion of a more 
substantial pilot study. 
Regarding the external validity of this study, there 
were two more important limitations. First, because only 
36% of those who were selected to participate in this study 
returned their packets, it is impossible to know if the 
other 64% differed from those who participated in this 
study in a meaningful way--perhaps some sort of 
self-selection bias was manifested. Second, only the 
psychodynamic and eclectic theoretical groups were 
represented by sufficient numbers to draw conclusions about 
their perceptions of the acceptability of symptom 
prescription--the evaluations of behavioral, cognitive, 
or family systems therapists may have been different. 
Future Research 
As mentioned earlier, only two other studies in the 
published literature have addressed the acceptability of 
symptom prescription to psychotherapists, and so this issue 
definitely warrants further empirical research. Certainly 
this study would bear systematic and conceptual replication. 
Such investigations might profitably use another example 
of symptom prescription (or other type of paradoxical 
intervention), a broader sample of theoretical orientations, 
and a broader sample of the therapeutic specialties (e.g., 
pastoral counseling, psychiatry, and social work). Further, 
so 
it could prove important to extend the examination of the 
acceptability of symptom prescription to clients--the 
ultimate consumers of psychotherapy. But perhaps the most 
interesting question this study raised has to do with the 
lack of congruence between therapists' attitudes about 
the use of deception and informed consent and their 
judgments of the acceptability of symptom prescription 
when the levels of deception and informed consent were 
manipulated. 
Summary 
Symptom prescription is the most directive and 
controversial of a group of unconventional techniques called 
paradoxical interventions. So it is not surprising to 
find--as this study did--that such a method is more 
acceptable to eclectic psychotherapists than to more 
traditional, insight-oriented psychodynamic therapists. 
A review of the literature revealed that the use of 
deception and a lack of informed consent are often part 
of the context in which paradoxical interventions are 
delivered. Accordingly, it seemed likely that these ethical 
problems could be important in contributing to the 
controversy surrounding paradoxical interventions. 
Nevertheless, manipulating these salient ethical aspects 
of the context of a symptom prescription did not evidence 
a statistically significant effect on therapists' 
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perceptions of the acceptability of the intervention in 
this study. However, the results of this study do suggest 
that psychotherapists' attitudes about deception and 
informed consent were related to their judgments of the 
acceptability of the symptom prescription. 
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APPENDIX A 
Demographics Questionnaire 
Please indicate your current status in regard to the following 
items. 
Age: Gender: Female 
Years of post-degree therapy experience: 
Primary theoretical orientation: 
Behavioral 
-- Cognitive 
-- Humanistic 
-- Psychodynamic 
-- Systems 
-- Eclectic 
Other 
Current number of client-hours per week: 
Male 
Please circle the number that best represents your level of 
agreement with the following statements about psychotherapy 
(l=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly 
agree). 
1. The therapist-not the client-bears the primary responsibility 
for progress in therapy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. There can be no significant change in therapy without the client 
first gaining insight. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The use of a deceptive intervention cannot be justified by 
any amount of constructive change. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. The most appropriate intervention is always the one that 
produces behavioral change most efficiently. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. No therapeutic intervention should be employed without first 
gaining the client's informed consent. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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APPENDIX B 
Vignette #1 
A young man sought therapy due to his compulsive vomiting 
(a physician determined that there were no physical causes of 
the vomiting). This client was so anxious about going on dates 
with eligible young women that he felt numerous urges to vomit 
during the course of the evening. His frequent absences to the 
bathroom understandably hindered his attempts at establishing 
intimate relationships, and he had developed a strong secondary 
anxiety (i.e., he had become very anxious about the prospect of 
becoming anxious, thus increasing his anxiety). He had begun 
avoiding dating situations entirely and had become extremely 
pessimistic about his ever being able to establish a permanent 
relationship with a woman. 
Reasoning that the anxiety and the vomiting had become 
part of a self-perpetuating system that seemed to be out of the 
client's control, the therapist decided to intervene directly 
with the problem behavior. The therapist wanted to help the client 
gain control over an apparently spontaneous behavior-the vomiting. 
The intervention chosen was to instruct the client to vomit 
voluntarily. The therapist believed that this intervention would 
result in one of two outcomes: (1) the young man would be unable 
to vomit intentionally and the problem would be resolved, or (2) 
the vomiting might continue, but there would be less anxiety 
associated with it (making it more manageable) because the client 
was being directed to continue vomiting. 
Before implementing the treatment, the therapist stated: 
"I know how to solve your problem, but I need you to trust me 
on this. Before I tell you, I need you to agree to follow my 
instructions exactly, without asking any questions. Will you 
do that?" The client agreed. 
The primary therapeutic strategy consisted of instructing 
the client to go into the bathroom exactly forty-five minutes 
before an upcoming date--with toothbrush in hand and mouthwash 
at hand-and to vomit deliberately for as long as he could. 
The rationale that was given to the client for following 
these instructions was as follows: "The reason that I want you 
to do this is that I think it will help you gain control over 
your vomiting-something that seems to be out of your control 
now. If you can vomit as I've directed you to, you will 
demonstrate that you really do have control over it, and you won't 
be anxious about it because I've given you permission to vomit. 
But I imagine that it will be difficult for you to vomit on 
purpose, and if that's the case, your problem will be solved." 
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Vignette #2 
A young man sought therapy due to his compulsive vomiting 
(a physician determined that there were no physical causes of 
the vomiting). This client was so anxious about going on dates 
with eligible young women that he felt numerous urges to vomit 
during the course of the evening. His frequent absences to the 
bathroom understandably hindered his attempts at establishing 
intimate relationships, and he had developed a strong secondary 
anxiety (i.e., he had become very anxious about the prospect of 
becoming anxious, thus increasing his anxiety). He had begun 
avoiding dating situations entirely and had become extremely 
pessimistic about his ever being able to establish a permanent 
relationship with a woman. 
Reasoning that the anxiety and the vomiting had become 
part of a self-perpetuating system that seemed to be out of the 
client's control, the therapist decided to intervene directly 
with the problem behavior. The therapist wanted to help the client 
gain control over an apparently spontaneous behavior-the vomiting. 
The intervention chosen was to instruct the client to vomit 
voluntarily. The therapist believed that this intervention would 
result in one of two outcomes: (1) the young man would be unable 
to vomit intentionally and the problem would be resolved, or (2) 
the vomiting might continue, but there would be less anxiety 
associated with it (making it more manageable) because the client 
was being directed to continue vomiting. 
Before implementing the treatment, the therapist stated: 
"I know how to solve your problem, but I need you to trust me 
on this. Before I tell you, I need you to agree to follow my 
instructions exactly, without asking any questions. Will you 
do that?" The client agreed. 
The primary therapeutic strategy consisted of instructing 
the client to go into the bathroom exactly forty-five minutes 
before an upcoming date-with toothbrush in hand and mouthwash 
at hand-and to vomit deliberately for as long as he could. 
Concerned that telling the client the actual nature of 
the intervention would diminish its therapeutic effects, the 
following rationale was given to the client: "You should follow 
my instructions in order to increase your awareness of the causes 
of the vomiting. Pay close attention to your thoughts, feelings, 
and sensations before, during, and after you vomit. Write these 
things down and bring them to our next session. This will help 
us to more effectively plan how to eliminate your problem." 
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Vignette #3 
A young man sought therapy due to his compulsive vomiting 
(a physician determined that there were no physical causes of 
the vomiting). This client was so anxious about going on dates 
with eligible young women that he felt numerous urges to vomit 
during the course of the evening. His frequent absences to the 
bathroom understandably hindered his attempts at establishing 
intimate relationships, and he had developed a strong secondary 
anxiety (i.e., he had become very anxious about the prospect of 
becoming anxious, thus increasing his anxiety). He had begun 
avoiding dating situations entirely and had become extremely 
pessimistic about his ever being able to establish a permanent 
relationship with a woman. 
Reasoning that the anxiety and the vomiting had become 
part of a self-perpetuating system that seemed to be out of the 
client's control, the therapist decided to intervene directly 
with the problem behavior. The therapist wanted to help the client 
gain control over an apparently spontaneous behavior-the vomiting. 
The intervention chosen was to instruct the client to vomit 
voluntarily. The therapist believed that this intervention would 
result in one of two outcomes: (1) the young man would be unable 
to vomit intentionally and the problem would be resolved, or (2) 
the vomiting might continue, but there would be less anxiety 
associated with it (making it more manageable) because the client 
was being directed to continue vomiting. 
Before implementing the treatment, the therapist stated: 
"There are many ways that we could address your problem, and I 
have an idea that I'd like to try with your permission. I know 
it will sound strange to you and it may even be unpleasant, but 
I'd like to ask you to continue vomiting for awhile. If you have 
any questions about this I will answer them now or as they come 
up later in treatment. Is that O.K. with you?" The client agreed. 
The primary therapeutic strategy consisted of instructing 
the client to go into the bathroom exactly forty-five minutes 
before an upcoming date-with toothbrush in hand and mouthwash 
at hand--and to vomit deliberately for as long as he could. 
The rationale that was given to the client for following 
these instructions was as follows: "The reason that I want you 
to do this is that I think it will help you gain control over 
your vomiting--something that seems to be out of your control 
now. If you can vomit as I've directed you to, you will 
demonstrate that you really do have control over it, and you won't 
be anxious about it because I've given you permission to vomit. 
But I imagine that it will be difficult for you to vomit on 
purpose, and if that's the case, your problem will be solved." 
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Vignette #4 
A young man sought therapy due to his compulsive vomiting 
(a physician determined that there were no physical causes of 
the vomiting). This client was so anxious about going on dates 
with eligible young women that he felt numerous urges to vomit 
during the course of the evening. His frequent absences to the 
bathroom understandably hindered his attempts at establishing 
intimate relationships, and he had developed a strong secondary 
anxiety (i.e., he had become very anxious about the prospect of 
becoming anxious, thus increasing his anxiety). He had begun 
avoiding dating situations entirely and had become extremely 
pessimistic about his ever being able to establish a permanent 
relationship with a woman. 
Reasoning that the anxiety and the vomiting had become 
part of a self-perpetuating system that seemed to be out of the 
client's control, the therapist decided to intervene directly 
with the problem behavior. The therapist wanted to help the client 
gain control over an apparently spontaneous behavior--the vomiting. 
The intervention chosen was to instruct the client to vomit 
voluntarily. The therapist believed that this intervention would 
result in one of two outcomes: (1) the young man would be unable 
to vomit intentionally and the problem would be resolved, or (2) 
the vomiting might continue, but there would be less anxiety 
associated with it (making it more manageable) because the client 
was being directed to continue vomiting. 
Before implementing the treatment, the therapist stated: 
"There are many ways that we could address your problem, and I 
have an idea that I'd like to try with your permission. I know 
it will sound strange to you and it may even be unpleasant, but 
I'd like to ask you to continue vomiting for awhile. If you have 
any questions about this I will answer them now or as they come 
up later in treatment. Is that O.K. with you?" The client agreed. 
The primary therapeutic strategy consisted of instructing 
the client to go into the bathroom exactly forty-five minutes 
before an upcoming date-with toothbrush in hand and mouthwash 
at hand-and to vomit deliberately for as long as he could. 
Concerned that telling the client the actual nature of 
the intervention would diminish its therapeutic effects, the 
following rationale was given to the client: "You should follow 
my instructions in order to increase your awareness of the causes 
of the vomiting. Pay close attention to your thoughts, feelings, 
and sensations before, during, and after you vomit. Write these 
things down and bring them to our next session. This will help 
us to more effectively plan how to eliminate your problem." 
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APPENDIX C 
Treatment Evaluation Inventory--Short Form 
Instructions: Please respond to the items listed below by circling 
the number that best indicates how you feel about the treatment 
decribed in the preceding vignette (!=Strongly disagree, 
2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree). 
1. I find this treatment to be an acceptable way of dealing with 
the client's problem. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I would be willing to use this procedure if I had to change 
the client's problem. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I believe that it would be acceptable to use this treatment 
without a client's consent. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I like the procedures used in this treatment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I believe this treatment is likely to be effective. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I believe the client will experience discomfort during the 
treatment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I believe this treatment is likely to result in permanent 
improvement. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I believe it would be acceptable to use this treatment with 
individuals who cannot choose treatments for themselves. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Overall, I have a positive reaction to this treatment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Intervention Rating Profile-15 
Instructions: The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain 
information that will aid in the selection of therapeutic 
interventions. Please indicate the number which best describes 
your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement 
(l=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly disagree, 4=Slightly 
agree, 5=Agree, 6=Strongly agree). 
1. This would be an acceptable intervention for the client's 
problem. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2. Most therapists would find this intervention appropriate for 
problems in addition to the one described. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. This intervention should prove effective in changing 
the client's problem. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
4. I would suggest the use of this intervention to other 
therapists. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. The client's problem is severe enough to warrant use of this 
intervention. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
6. Most therapists would find this intervention suitable for 
the problem described. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
7. I would be willing to use this intervention in a therapy 
setting. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
8. This intervention 
for the client. 
would not result in negative side effects 
1 2 3 4 
9. This intervention would be appropriate for 
clients. 
1 2 
10. This intervention 
therapy settings. 
3 
is consistent 
1 2 3 
11. The intervention was a fair way 
1 2 3 
4 
with those 
4 
to handle 
4 
5 6 
a variety of 
5 6 
I have used in 
5 6 
the client's problem. 
5 6 
12. This intervention is reasonable for the problem described. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
13. I liked the procedures used in this intervention. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
14. This intervention was a good way to handle the client's 
problem. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
15. Overall, this intervention would be beneficial for the client. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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